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One argument for fictional realism, the view that there are such things as fictional characters, 
proceeds by arguing that we need to accept there are fictional characters in order to provide an 
adequate account of intuitively true and meaningful reports containing fictional names, reports 
such as »In Hamlet, Hamlet equivocates«. For, granted some plausible assumptions, it seems 
that the truth and meaningfulness of such reports requires that the names they contain genuinely 
refer to fictional characters. However I argue that the fictional realist herself faces problems 
providing an account of certain other forms of intuitively true reports. These are reports that 
intuitively seem to be about fictional characters but where the apparent reference to the fictional 
character is achieved, not via a fictional name, but rather descriptively. I consider, in particular, 
reports involving specific uses of indefinite descriptions, such as the report »In Hamlet, a 
certain prince equivocates«. The problem facing the realist is that the truth of this report requires 
the indefinite description »a certain prince« to denote the fictional character Hamlet. And this, 
in turn, seems to require that the fictional character Hamlet satisfies that description, and hence 
that the fictional character Hamlet genuinely be a prince. However I argue against the view that 
fictional characters genuinely have the properties ascribed to them in the fictions where they 
occur. In the play Hamlet, Hamlet is characterized as being a human and being a prince. But, I 
argue, even if we accept that there are fictional characters and that Hamlet is one of them, we 
shouldn’t take the fictional character Hamlet to genuinely be a human or a prince. I then 
consider and reject various other strategies the fictional realist might adopt to try and provide 
an account of descriptive reports. I argue that, ultimately, the realist must take such reports to 
be made within the scope of a make-believe or pretense that there is a world which is as the 
play Hamlet describes. For, while the realist shouldn’t accept that the fictional character of 
Hamlet is really a prince, she can nevertheless grant that it counts as one within the scope of 
the make-believe that Hamlet correctly describes a real world. And she can maintain that the 
intuitive truth of such reports depends upon whether the sentences they embed count as being 
true within the scope of the relevant make-believe. However I note that this account is also 
available to the irrealist who denies there are fictional characters. For, while the irrealist denies 
that really there is anything corresponding to Hamlet, she nevertheless grants that, within the 
make-believe, there is such a thing and it is a prince. Moreover it is very natural to extend this 
strategy to cover the sorts of reports containing fictional names, such as »In Hamlet, Hamlet 
equivocates«, that were invoked by the argument for fictional realism initially considered. 
However, if we adopt this strategy, we can explain our intuitions concerning these reports 
without our having to accept there are fictional objects. And so the argument for fictional 
realism that we initially considered is undermined. The very apparatus the realist invokes to 
provide an account of »In Hamlet, a certain prince equivocates« allows the irrealist to provide 
an account of »In Hamlet, Hamlet equivocates« without invoking fictional objects. 
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